application by the courts 6 led to its legislative modification. 7 Section 3501 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 8
6. In the view of Congress, courts had adopted, under pre-1968 case law, an unreasonably broad definition of "unnecessary delay." Among the cases in which courts reversed convictions because of "unnecessary delay" were: Alston v. United States, 348 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1965 ) (arrestee questioned "for at least 5 minutes"); Spriggs v. United States, 335 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1964 ) (confession made after 30 minutes in custody); and Ginoza v. United States, 279 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1960 ) (delay of 30 minutes). See 113 CONG. REc. 36,062 (1967) (remarks of Senator Bible) (quoting S. REP. No. 600, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965) ):
[T]he ruling ... [was] based on the ground that no interrogation of any length is permissible and, indeed, an arrested person is not to be taken to the precinct or headquarters for booking and fingerprinting, but it is to be taken before a magistrate forthwith. Thus, "without unnecessary delay," was considered to mean "without any delay." (discussing United States v. Jones, criminal no. 366-63 (D.D.C. 1963 ) (15 minutes)). These and additional cases are noted at 113 CoNG. REc. 36,062 (1967) (quoting S. REP. No. 600, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1965) (a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances. (b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such persons before a magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or other officer.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person without interrogation by limits the scope of Mallory. Specifically, subsection 3501(c) declares that "a confession ... shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing [the confessant] before a magistrate ... if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest . . . . "9 Most courts, following the lead of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Halbert, 10 have interpreted section 3501 to require the admission of all voluntary 11 confessions without regard to prearraignment delay; 12 in effect, overruling Mallory. Others, most notably the Second Circuit, have held that subsection 3501(c) "codifies" a limited Mallory rule, permitting the suppression of voluntary confessions if they are made more than six hours after arrest and during 13 an unnecessary delay in arraignment.14 anyone, or at any time at which the person who made or gave such confession was not under arrest or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term "confession" means any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing. 18 u.s.c. § 3501 (1982) .
9. Many courts have ignored § 350l(c)'s prescription that the six-hour period start to run immediately upon arrest. See note 71 infra.
10. 436 F.2d 1226 436 F.2d (9th Cir. 1970 . 11. Determining "voluntariness" has proved troublesome. See Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445, 453 n.4 (1985) ("The voluntariness rubric has been variously condemned as 'useless,' 'perplexing,' and 'legal double-talk.' "). Under the traditional formula, a court determines whether a confession was voluntary by examining the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the confession is " 'the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,' or whether, instead, the confessant's 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.'" Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) ). For a list of considerations relevant under the "totality of the circumstances" test, and a collection of cases employing them, see United States ex rel. Mattox v. Scott, 372 F. Supp. 304, 309-10 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd. in part and revd. in part, 507 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974 States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976) ; United States v. Campanile, 516 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1975); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972 ), revd., 412 U.S. 205 (1973 ; United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1971 ), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972 ; United States v. Hathorn, 451 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1971 ; United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970 ; United States v. Arcediano, 371 F. Supp. 457, 468 (D. N.J. 1974) ; see also United States v. Rubio, 709 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1983) ; United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975 988 (1972) . 13. The term "during" should be read as "during or following.'' A confession is obtained "during" an unnecessary delay if such a delay occurred at any time prior to the confession, even though arraignment was not possible at the very moment that the confession was given. See Section I.B infra.
14. See United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1984 ; United States v. Khan, 625 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1986 ); United States v. Ramos, 605 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1985 ; United States v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Wis. 1975 ; United States v. Leland, 376 F. Supp. [Vol. 84:1731 This Note considers the proper interpretation of section 3501 15 and develops a single theme: Mallory continues to govern the admissibility of confessions obtained more than six hours after arrest and, therefore, a post-sixth-hour confession will be inadmissible if it follows a period of unnecessary prearraignment delay. Section 3501 only prohibits the application of Mallory's exclusionary rule to confessions obtained within six hours of arrest.
The issues raised by subsection 350l(c) and addressed in Part I of this Note may be introduced best by way of illustration.
Late one night, Al broke into a federal post office and absconded with cash, stamps, and equipment. He was arrested at 1 p.m. the following day. Officers could have arraigned Al at any time before 5 p.m., but when booking and other administrative tasks ended at 3 p.m., they decided to begin interrogation. At 8 p.m., seven hours after arrest, Al made a full and free confession.
At trial, Al moved to have his confession suppressed on the ground that it was obtained more than six hours after arrest and as a result of an unnecessary prearraignment delay in violation of rule S(a).
Part I examines the admissibility of Al's confession. Al's case presents two issues. The first is whether a voluntary confession obtained more than six hours after arrest can be suppressed solely because of prearraignment delay. Halbert and its progeny say no -that voluntariness is the sole criterion for the admissibility of confessions under section 3501, and, therefore, Al's voluntary confession may not be suppressed. This Note disagrees. Section I.A examines subsection 350l(c) and concludes that voluntariness is not the sole criterion for the admissibility of confessions. A voluntary confession may be suppressed if it is obtained more than six hours after arrest and during an unnecessary prearraignment delay.
The second issue presented by Al's case is whether there was an unnecessary delay in arraigning Al. Prior to section 3501, the delay between 3 p.m. (when booking was complete) and 5 p.m. (when arraignment was no longer possible) would surely have been deemed unnecessary. Some contend, however, that section 3501 has redefined the meaning of "unnecessary delay" as used in rule 5(a) to exclude all 1193 , 1200 (D. Del. 1974 (Subsection 3501(c) is "the statutory codification of the McNabb· Mallory rule."). In United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1970) , and United States v. Yong Bing-Gong, 594 F. Supp. 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) , the courts suppressed confessions on grounds of unreasonable delay. The Robinson court noted that " [u] nder Mallory, a confession made during a period of unnecessary delay ... is inadmissible at ... trial." The court also explained that "18 U.S.C. § 350l(c) does not nullify this judicial rule of evidence, but only restricts its application in circumstances" where the confession is obtained within six hours of arrest. 439 F.2d at 563-64. Finally, note United States v. Gaines, 555 F.2d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1977) , where the Seventh Circuit concluded that a voluntary confession obtained more than six hours after arrest may, but need not, be suppressed, depending on whether its suppression will advance the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
15. For the purpose of discussion, this Note assumes that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is constitutional. But see note 40 infra.
delay within the first six hours of arrest. Under this interpretation, delays within the first six hours would be irrelevant to a determination of admissibility, and the 3 to 5 p.m. delay would not be grounds to suppress Al's confession. Section I.B of this Note concludes, however, that no redefinition has occurred. The delay from 3 to 5 p.m. was unnecessary within the meaning of rule 5(a) and Al's confession should therefore be suppressed.
Part I thus argues that the admissibility of post-sixth-hour confessions is governed by Mallory, under which a voluntary confession is inadmissible if, but only if, it follows a period of unnecessary delay. Part II addresses a possible objection to this conclusion -namely, that, with limited exceptions, subsection 350l(c) renders all post-sixthhour confessions inadmissible without regard to the reasonableness of the prearraignment delay. This interpretation is derived by negative implication from the proviso in subsection 350l(c) 16 and would require courts to suppress confessions even though there has been no unnecessary delay, and even though the confessions would be admissible under Mallory. To avoid this result, courts have expanded the proviso's narrow exception to include all forms of reasonable delay, 17 thus rendering the proviso as broad as Mallory itself. This Note agrees that courts should not read subsection 3501(c) to imply that all post-sixthhour confessions are inadmissible, but disagrees that the way to avoid that implication is to expand the meaning of the proviso. The language and the history of the proviso, as well as general rules of statutory interpretation, defy its expansion. Part II argues instead that the proviso's negative implication was unintended and is inconsistent with congressional purpose, and should be rejected. Ct. 2705 Ct. , 2710 Ct. (1986 ; see also INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) ; Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979) . [Vol. 84:1731 Under subsections 350l(a) and (b), voluntariness is the sole criterion for the admissibility of confessions. 20 Subsection 350l(a) plainly states that confessions shall be admissible into evidence if voluntarily given. Subsection 350l(b) then lists five factors 21 for the trial judge to consider in determining voluntariness, the first of which is "the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment .... " 22 Prearraignment delay under these subsections is relevant only insofar as it affects the determination of voluntariness. Because Al's confession was voluntary, neither subsection 350l(a) nor 350l(b) offers grounds for its suppression.
Under subsection 350l(c), however, voluntariness is not the sole criterion for the admissibility of confessions. Subsection 350l(c) states that a confession "shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay" if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the confession is made voluntarily; (2) the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury; and (3) the confession is made within six hours after arrest.23
The plain implication 24 of 3501(c) is that a confession may be sup- When Senator Scott of Pennsylvania introduced the amendment which resulted in the sixhour provision in § 3501(c), he suggested that Congress delete the first two conditions in subsec· tion (c), and rewrite it as suggested here. 114 CONG. REC. 14,184 (1968 S. 37, 42 (1979) . But see United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The notion that because the words ofa statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification."); Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) pressed "solely because of delay" if the criteria in subsection 350l(c) are not met. v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 924 (3d Cir. 1974) . 31. 436 F.2d at 1234. Note that subsection 350l(b) concerns the delay between arrest and arraignment, rather than, as under subsection 350l(c), the delay between,arrest and confession. Given that the subsections express different concerns, it seems anomalous to read subsection 350l(c) as relevant only to application of 350l(b).
[Vol. 84:1731 more, subsection 3501(c) permits a confession to be found involuntary on that basis alone.) The six-hour provision, said the court, is designed to restrict the judge's "discretion" in determining voluntariness under 350l(b).32
The court's interpretation in Halbert is open to serious objections. First of all, subsection 3501(c) does not say that a confession shall not be "involuntary" solely because of delay if made within six hours; it says that such a confession shall not be inadmissible. "Inadmissible" is a broader term than "involuntary," since a confession may be inadmissible for reasons other than involuntariness. 33 Equating the two ignores Congress' choice of terms. 34
Equating the two also makes the first condition in 350l(c) nonsense. For if the two terms are synonymous, 350l(c) requires that a confession not be declared involuntary solely because of delay if the confession is found to be voluntary. 35 The Halbert interpretation is additionally suspect because it renders the enactment of subsection 3501(c) pointless. 36 At the time section 3501 was enacted, no court had ever held a confession involuntary because of delay alone. 37 There was no need, therefore, for Congress In the case before us no new circumstances have been created by legislation. But the court is forbidden to give effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely contrary. We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power. 43. Halbert's reasoning seems to employ three steps:
(1) prearraignment delay of less than six hours can render a confession involuntary under § 3501 (b ) . (While the court does not refer specifically to delays of less than six hours, it docs say employ a constitutional standard of voluntariness. 44 But this assumption is defeated by 3501(b)'s legislative history and, significantly, refutes the very basis for the Halbert decision. Halbert based its decision on the argument that the intent of Congress was to broaden the admissibility of confessions 45 by reinstating the voluntariness standard. Yet, as demonstrated above, in order to defend the constitutionality of its interpretation 46 and still give effect to subsection (c), Halbert must simultaneously assert that Congress intended to restrict the admissibility of confessions by imposing a standard of voluntariness which is stricter than that required by the Constitution or developed by the courts. 47 The most important objection to the Halbert interpretation, however, is that it is inconsistent with the legislative history of section 3501. 48 Ironically, legislative history was the principal support offered in Halbert for its interpretation of subsection 3501(c). 4 9 The legislative history relied upon, however, was wholly irrelevant to the issue decided. The court began and ended its history with Senate Report No. 1097 , dated April 29, 1968 The Report accompanied an early that a confession may be rendered "involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment." Halbert, 436 F.2d at 1234; see also United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1983 [Vol. 84:1731 version of subsection 3501(c). That version prohibited the suppression of any confession solely because of prearraignment delay "if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury." 51 The Halbert court, in interpreting the six-hour provision, relied upon the legislative history of a version of subsection 3501(c) that contained no time provision at al1! 52
The six-hour provision, the subject of Ha/bert's interpretation, was added as a floor amendment on May 21, 1968. 53 It was added not to limit the judge's "discretion" in determining voluntariness under subsection 350l(b) but, according to the amendment's sponsor, to limit "the period during which confessions may be received." 54 The legislative history provides a further insight arguing against The court concluded: "This indicates that the minority of the committee that proposed the legislation did not think that confessions given more than six hours after arrest would be automatically inadmissible under the bill." 436 F.2d at 1237. The Senators' remarks were addressed to a wholly different piece oflegislation, in which there was no six-hour provision or time limitation of any sort. Their remarks were made on April 29, 1968. On May 21, 1968, Senator Scott introduced the amendment to insert a six-hour limitation on delays in arraignment. The amendment was adopted that same day. 114 CONG. REC. 14, 184-86 (1968) .
53. 114 CONG. REC. 14, 184-86 (1968) .
54.
Id. at 14,184 (remarks of Sen. Scott). The six-hour limit was the result of a compromise between those who preferred a three-hour limit, and those who preferred no limit at all. A proviso was added two days later to lift the time limit in certain cases of "reasonable delay," id.
at 14,787, but with or without the proviso, the admissibility of confessions was understood to be governed by more than issues of voluntariness.
Ann. § 4-140, 55 and Senator Scott, who introduced the six-hour amendment, explained that subsection 350l(c) "is an attempt to conform, as nearly as practicable," to the District of Columbia statute. 56 It is noteworthy, therefore, that section 4-140 envisioned the continued viability of Mallory. 51 The purpose of subsection 4-l 40(b) was not to eliminate Mallory, but to restrict its application for the first few hours of arrest. 58 In light of the foregoing, Halbert's interpretation of subsection 350l(c) is untenable. The purpose of subsection 350l(c) is to prohibit application of Mallory's exclusionary rule to confessions obtained within six hours of arrest; Mallory still governs the admissibility of confessions obtained thereafter. This interpretation accords with the plain meaning of the statute, is consistent with the legislative history, permits subsection 3501(b) to employ a constitutional standard of voluntariness, and does not leave rule 5(a) as a rule entirely without a remedy. 59
B. Rule 5(a) and the Meaning of "Unnecessary Delay" After Section 3501
Having concluded that a court may suppress a voluntary confession because of an unnecessary delay in violation of rule 5(a), the ques- [ Vol. 84:1731 tion remains whether such a delay occurred in Al's case. Prior to 3501, the delay from 3 to 5 p.m. would plainly qualify as unnecessary delay. 60 There is authority in judicial opinions and secondary authorities, however, to suggest that section 3501 redefines "unnecessary delay" in rule 5(a) to exclude delays within the first six hours of arrest. 61 If this is so, determination of the necessity of a prearraignment delay need only consider the state of affairs in existence at the expiration of the six-hour term -the first six hours are irrelevant. By this view, the fact that Al could have been arraigned from 3 to 5 p.m. would not render the seven-hour delay "unnecessary" since arraignment was not possible after the expiration of the six-hour term (from 7 p.m. until Al's confession one hour later). The most direct authority for this position comes from Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 62 in which Chief Judge Seitz writes:
While the Federal Rules' provision [rule 5(a)] regarding presentation before a magistrate is "procedural," unlike the "substantive" rule of § 3501, the sanction imposed by federal courts for failure to comply with Rule 5(a) is suppression of statements taken during the period of "unnecessary delay." Since § 3501 regulates suppression of such statements, it should be viewed as amending the meaning of "unnecessary delay" as used in Rule 5(a), rather than leaving that term's meaning unchanged and simply allowing the Rule to be violated without sanction. 63 This Note rejects this analysis. Section 3501 does not amend the meaning of "unnecessary delay"; it simply removes the exclusionary remedy for violations of rule 5(a) when a confession is obtained within ("Rule 5(a) cannot be said to have been violated when the ••. interview, and the resultant confession, occurs within six hours of arrest, at least not, as here, where that interview in no way affects the speed with which the defendant is presented before a magistrate.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Shoemaker, 542 F.2d 561, 563 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976 (confusedly suggesting that a "reasonable time" under rule 5(a) is "specified to be six hours after arrest"). Finally, see the cases cited in note 71 infra. If, as in those cases, courts exclude reasonable delay in calculating the six-hour period, a "seven-hour delay" will require seven hours of unnecessary delay -thus, because a post-sixth-hour confession will always be preceded by a post-sixth-hour unnecessary delay, the first six hours of unnecessary delay will be irrelevant. This is a radical, and unsupported, interpretation of § 350 I.
62. 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974).
63. 502 F.2d at 923 n.5. six hours of arrest. An "unnecessary" delay may still occur within six hours of arrest.
The weight of authority suggests that subsection 350l(c) does not redefine "unnecessary delay." Prior to the adoption of the six-hour amendment, for instance, Congress intended not to "redefine" rule 5(a), 64 but to overrule Mallory. 65 To conclude that the meaning of "unnecessary delay" has been changed by subsection 350l(c), therefore, one must find evidence that, with the passage of the six-hour amendment, the intent of Congress changed from eliminating a remedy for a violation to redefining the violation itself. The available evidence suggests the opposite. There is some indication in the legislative history of § 4-140 that the statute does not redefine "unnecessary delay." Speaking of an early version of § 4-140, one observer remarked that it does not amend Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that an officer making an arrest shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available magistrate, and that is still the law. Title I only overrules ... the socalled Mallory rule ....
• • . As above stated, [it] in no respect amends or modifies Rule 5(a), but only provides that statements shall not be inadmissable because of delay.
Anticrime Legislation, 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 4 66. United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026 , 1029 , 1035 (2d Cir. 1984 ; United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1983 ) ("Section 3501 was intended to supersede the McNabb-Mallory rule as the source of federal supervisory power to suppress confessions obtained in violation of Federal Rule 5(a)."); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 114 CONG. REC. 16,068 (1968) ("In effect, Section 350l(c) would leave the 'without unnecessary delay' provision of Rule 5(a) ... as a rule without a meaningful remedy."); C.
[ Vol. 84:1731 The text of section 3501 makes no reference to rule 5(a) and gives no indication that section 3501 affects the meaning of "unnecessary delay" as used in that rule. Section 3501 declares that if its three criteria are met, a confession shall not be inadmissible; not that delay shall be necessary. If section 3501 amended the language of 5(a), it did so by the most distant of implications.
There is, in addition, a policy objection to excluding the first six hours from a determination of "unnecessary delay." Suppose that in the hypothetical above, Al was arrested on a Friday afternoon. If no magistrate was available on the weekend, and if the delay from 3 to 5 p.m. was deemed "necessary," the officers' failure to arraign Al would permit them to continue interrogation until Monday morning. In other words, the officers would be rewarded all weekend for their failure to arraign Al on Friday.61
Courts and commentators have refused to interpret section 3501 to permit officers to interrogate an accused for six hours and only then concern themselves with arraignment. 68 Failure to arraign within six hours of arrest may not be penalized, for that period is protected by statute, but it should not be rewarded either. 6 9 Officers should not be permitted to interrogate the accused before arraignment and more than six hours after arrest, under a claim of reasonable delay, when the officers themselves are responsible for the failure to arraign the ac- Any reference to § 3501 "limiting" or "overruling" Mallory presupposes that rule 5(a) remains unchanged. Section 350l(c) modified either Mallory or rule 5(a), not both. 67. In rejecting this construction, one court observed that "it implies that law enforcement officers need not bestir themselves during the first six hours, and that the test of reasonableness is to be applied only to the circumstances existing after the passage of six hours •.•• " United States v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011 , 1018 (W.D. Wis. 1975 .
68. " [T] he circumstances existing during the entire interval from the time of arrest to the time of the confession should be considered in determining reasonableness." United States v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011 , 1018 (W.D. Wis. 1975 ). Professor Wright concurs: "[I]t was not intended that the arresting authorities were to have six hours plus whatever amount of time" is necessary for arraignment. C. WRIGHT, supra note 50, § 74, at 114. But see 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 862(a), 623 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) (The proviso in § 350l(c) equates "a six hour plus period with a six hour one, if the delay in excess of six hours constitutes a reasonable period within which to reach a magistrate.") (emphasis added).
69. This interpretation would remove the reward from officers who, for example, arrest a person at 2 p.m., and, knowing that a magistrate will not be available after 7 p.m., fail to arraign him before that time. A confession obtained at 10 p.m. that night would not be admissible. While this interpretation does not create an incentive to arraign promptly (the officers still have no incentive to arraign the person before 7 p.m.), it does reduce the likelihood of reward for failure to do so. cused prior to the expiration of the six-hour term. 70 The foregoing considerations recommend the second interpretation, under which the meaning of "unnecessary delay" and the standard for finding a violation under rule 5(a) remain unchanged. Under this interpretation, section · 3501 merely removes the exclusionary sanction from a violation of rule 5(a) when the confession is obtained within six hours immediately 71 following arrest. This interpretation flows most directly from the text of the statute, accords with the congressional intent as expressed in the legislative history, and rightfully removes the reward from officers for their failure to arraign the arrestee within six hours of arrest.
Part I v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1978) , the court held that a reasonable delay between arrest and interrogation, for the purpose of medical attention and lodging, does not count toward the six-hour time limit in subsection 350l(c); the government is given an aggregate of six hours time in which to interrogate. The court wrote:
[The confession], even though made about twenty hours after his arrest, did not follow any period of unnecessary delay. The period during which appellant received medical treatment (at his request) and overnight lodging ... should not be counted in computing unnecessary delay ..•. Thus, appellant's [confession] was in effect made no more than four and a half hours after his federal arrest, a period within the limits of 18 U.S.C. § 350l(c) .... 588 F.2d at 862-63 (citing United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1971 ), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972 ) (footnote omitted, emphasis supplied); see also United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1983) ; United States v. Bear Killer, 534 F.2d 1253 , 1257 (8th Cir. 1976 [ Vol. 84:1731 unnecessary delay. Part I.B has demonstrated that Al's seventh-hour confession was obtained following a period of unnecessary delay. Al's confession should be suppressed.
II. THE MEANING OF THE PROVISO IN SUBSECTION 3501(c)
Subsection 350l(c) creates a "safe harbor" for confessions obtained within six hours of arrest. This is uncontroversial. Part I argued, however, that subsection 350l(c) has no effect on confessions obtained after six hours; the admissibility of those confessions is still determined by Mallory. This Part anticipates and refutes an objection to that argument.
A. The Negative Implication of the Proviso
The proviso in subsection 350l(c) appears by negative implication to turn a "safe harbor" into an exclusionary rule, and to require the suppression of all post-sixth-hour confessions without regard to the reasonableness of delay, except in specific circumstances. Note that the proviso does not extend the six-hour "safe harbor." It renders it inapplicable. It also refers to the six-hour term as a "limitation" that "shall not apply" to a discrete set of cases. The implication is that the time limit itself restricts the admissibility of confessions; it does not merely prohibit their suppression. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the proviso only has effect if, in its absence, confessions obtained more than six hours after arrest would be inadmissible without regard to the reasonableness of delay. If, on the contrary, the admissibility of such confessions would be governed by Mallory, the proviso serves no purpose -it mandates a limited "reasonableness" test in an area already governed by that standard. The presence of the proviso, therefore, suggests that the six-hour limit is a bar to the admissibility of confessions. If this negative implication is given effect, all post-sixth-hour confessions 72 . See The Court Versus the Congress, supra note 39, at 751; Admissibility of Co11fessio11s, supra note 39, at 279-80, suggesting that confessions obtained more than six hours after arrest are automatically inadmissible unless the delay is due to problems of transportation. Many courts have recognized this argument, but have rejected it. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 924 {Jd Cir. 1974) .
73. 18 U.S.C. § 350l{c) (1982).
must be suppressed unless the delay fits within the terms of the proviso. Thus, confessions may be inadmissible even though there was no unnecessary delay, and even though they would be admissible under Mallory. 74 There are two ways to avoid this result. 75 The first, adopted by the courts, is to expand the proviso so broadly that it encompasses all reasonable delay, thus reaching as far as Mallory. 76 As Part II.B shows, however, the language, history, and purpose of the proviso do not support a broad reading. The second, and preferable, way of avoiding undesirable restrictions on the admissibility of confessions is to reject the proviso's negative implication. Part II.C advocates this second approach.
B. Judicial Expansion of the Proviso
To avoid suppressing confessions admissible under Mallory, courts have expanded subsection 350l(c)'s proviso well beyond its literal scope, to reach all reasonable delays, not just those due to problems of transportation -e.g., to reach delays due to the fact that the magistrate was off-duty, 1 7 or the suspect required medical attention, 78 etc. 79 74. See note 97 infra.
75. There is, in fact, a third way. Many courts avoid giving effect to this negative implication by concluding that § 3501 renders voluntariness the sole criterion of admissibility. These courts then fall back on the observation that the length of prearraignment delay is only one factor to be considered in determining whether a confession is involuntary under 350l(b). They conclude, therefore, that 3501 could not have intended that all post-sixth hour confes~ions be held "involuntary" solely because of delay.
The premise that voluntariness is the sole criterion for the admissibility of confessions was discredited in Part I, and so this technique will not be addressed here. Even if accepted, however, this premise does not eliminate the negative implication. If voluntariness is the sole criterion, the proviso implies that all post-sixth hour confessions are "involuntary" under § 350l(b) unless excused by the proviso's terms. Instead of trying to resolve this problem, Halbert and its progeny have summarily dismissed it, with a short statement that the implication is contrary to the intent of the statute.
76. See notes 77-79 infra. 77. United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 378 {2d Cir. 1971) ("350l(c) necessarily subsumes the availability of a magistrate"); see also Marrero, 450 F.2d at 379 (Friendly, C.J., concurring) .
78. United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858, 862-63 {2d Cir. 1978 ) (medical attention and overnight lodging is not unreasonable delay within the meaning of § 350l(c)).
79. See United States v. Rubio, 709 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1983 [Vol. 84:1731 This expansion is effective, but indefensible. If Congress meant to subsume all forms of reasonable delay within the proviso, it would not have specifically included some forms while obviously excluding others. In 350l(c), an exception to the six-hour limit is expressly provided for only certain types of reasonable delayspecifically, delays caused by the means of transportation or the distance to be traveled. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 80 a rule of statutory construction, suggests that the proviso should not be broadened beyond these limits.
Furthermore, a literal interpretation of the proviso cannot be dismissed merely because it does not excuse all forms of reasonable delay. 81 Before the proviso was added, Congress presumably intended that all confessions obtained more than six hours after arrest be suppressed. 82 If this was so, Congress had created a general rule of inadmissibility. 83 A partial exception to this rule cannot be condemned simply because it leaves part of the rule inta~t. 81. Furthermore, it is not altogether clear that prohibiting all confessions obtained through interrogation more than six hours after arrest would be more restrictive than Mallory. Several courts have held that interrogation designed to elicit a confession is not permissible under Mallory even during a reasonable delay in arraignment. If this is so, of course, an absolute six-hour limit on interrogation is not more restrictive than Mallory. See United States v. Middleton, 344 It may be argued, however, that since there is no principled reason to distinguish between delays that are reasonable due to the distance to be traveled and delays that are reasonable due to the unavailability of the magistrate, and since Congress provided an exception for the former, the proviso should be read to include the latter as well. This is the principal argument used by the courts to avoid t_he plain construction and to broaden the scope of the proviso.
Part II.C's examination of the proviso's legislative history, however, suggests that the proviso was inserted in 3501(c) as a result of a misunderstanding, and that its presence therefore does not justify its expansion.
C. Reading the Proviso Out of Subsection 3501 (c)
Courts should reject the proviso's negative implication and determine the admissibility of post-sixth hour confessions under Mallory. There are persuasive reasons to believe that the proviso's negative implication was unintended.
The legislative history of section 3501 suggests that the proviso was added because of a misunderstanding. 84 On May 21, 1968, Senator Scott of Pennsylvania introduced an amendment to insert the sixhour time provision in subsection 3501(c). 85 The amendment passed, but during the debate Senator Allott of Colorado expressed concern about the time provision's effect in rural areas of the country, where the distance to the nearest magistrate might preclude arraignment within six hours. 86 Two days later, Senator Allott introduced the proviso now contained in subsection 350l(c), lifting the six-hour time "limit" in cases in which the delay is "reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest" magistrate. 87 This history suggests that the proviso was the result of a misunderstanding for two reasons. The first reason is that the proviso is solely responsible for the problem that it was designed to solve. There was the addition of the proviso, had excused reasonable delay, neither the proviso nor the efforts to expand it, would have been necessary. 84. In construing statutes, courts must sometimes acknowledge that the legislature has made a mistake. While trying to make sense of a statute, Justice Stevens has twice confronted " 'the consequence of a legislative accident, perhaps caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should.' " United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 118-19 (1985) "All kinds of things can happen, as I know as a former prosecuting attorney in a rural county. I think it is dangerous for us to try to set a limit on this matter.''). 87. 114 CONG. REC. 14,787 (1968) .
[ Vol. 84:1731 nothing in subsection 350l(c), prior to the proviso, to suggest that the six-hour term restricted the admissibility of confessions. The subsection said only that no confession shall be inadmissible solely because of delay if it is made within six hours of arrest. It said nothing about what happens to confessions if they are not made within that period. One would reasonably assume that the admissibility of such confessions would remain unaffected. It was only when the proviso was added that the six-hour provision appeared to take on a restrictive function. And yet the legislative history demonstrates that the proviso was not inserted in order to restrict the admissibility of confessionsthe proviso was inserted because of concern that, in certain circumstances, the six-hour term was too restrictive. The second reason to suspect a misunderstanding is that the reasons Senator Allott gave for adding the proviso do not justify its limited exceptions, or, indeed, its presence at all. 88 In both rural and urban areas, subsection 350l(c) permits officers to interrogate an accused during the six hours immediately following arrest. 89 Senator Allott was concerned that arraignment in rural areas would not be possible within six hours of arrest. But the fact that arraignment may be delayed does not justify extending the period for interrogation in rural areas.
The proviso in subsection 350l(c) was apparently inserted for fear that, in its absence, any confession would be inadmissible unless arraignment occurred within six hours after arrest. But this concern was unfounded. Under subsection 350l(c) and Mallory, the relevant delay is between arrest and confession, 90 not between arrest and arraignment. Postconfession delay will not render a confession inadmissible.91 88. Consider the exchange between Senators Allott and McClellan (Sen. McClellan originally opposed any time limit, but later conceded to the six-hour provision). Sen. Allott: "[Supposing that] you do not have a U.S. commissioner within 200 miles; how do you arraign a man in 3 hours, or in 6 hours, for that matter?" Sen. McClellan: "That is the point. You cannot in 3 hours. But we are trying to make some concession here. There may be instances where [6 hours] would not be adequate .••. " 114 CONG. R. Ec. 14,185 (1968) ; see also note 86 supra (remarks of Sen. Cotton).
89. Under § 3501, prior to the inclusion of the proviso, officials in rural and urban jurisdictions were treated identically. They were permitted to arrest a person, sit him down, and interrogate him for six hours, with the understanding that at the expiration of the sixth hour, no confession thereafter obtained through interrogation was admissible if it followed a period of unnecessary delay. It is difficult to conceive how rural jurisdictions were disadvantaged under this arrangement. They faced no penalty for failing to arraign within six hours; subsection 3501(c) did not deprive rural officials of any advantages which accrued to their urban counterparts. The fact that one may "not have a U.S. commissioner within 200 miles" and that arraign· ment may not be possible within 3 or 6 hours was wholly irrelevant to the merits of § 3501.
90. Note that the relevant delay is that between arrest and confession, not arrest and interrogation. See note 91 infra. The proviso's history therefore casts doubt on whether the proviso or its negative implication accords with the congressional intent behind subsection 3501(c).
Furthermore, the District of Columbia statute,9 2 upon which section 3501 was based, contained a three-hour limit but did not call for the automatic exclusion of confessions obtained more than three hours after arrest. Rather, Congress envisioned that at the end of three hours, Mallory would kick in to render confessions inadmissible only if obtained during an unreasonable prearraignment delay. 93 The similarity of the two provisions 94 suggests that Congress possessed the same intent with regard to subsection 350l(c).9 5
Rejecting the negative implication is also consistent with the congressional intent to encourage the admissibility of voluntary confessions. 96 It is difficult to understand why Congress, in an effort to broaden the admissibility of confessions, would adopt a rule of admissibility more restrictive 97 than the one it sought to relax. 98 does not retroactively change the circumstances under which he made the disclosures."); 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 50, § 74, at 113 (1982) :
It is the time when the confession is given, not the time when the arrested person is finally brought before the magistrate, that is significant. A confession given within six hours is not to be excluded for delay regardless of how long the delay may be after the confession is obtained. 95. This argument is weakened slightly by the fact that the D.C. statute contains a threehour limit, while § 350l's limit is six hours. Initially, § 350l's drafters, citing the D.C. statute, proposed a limit of three hours. The six-hour limit was reached as a result of compromise between those favoring the shorter period and those favoring no period at all. See note 88 supra.
In the spirit of compromise, it is possible, of course, that the supporters of the three-hour limit agreed to six hours in exchange for the other side's concession to make the six-hour limit an absolute bar on the admissibility of confessions, rather than to leave the issue of admissibility to Mallory. To the extent that this is likely, the relevance of the D.C. statute is lessened.
96 States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15, 20-21 (10th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 377-78 (2d Cir. 1971 ), cert. denied. 405 U.S. 933 (1972 ; United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 , 1231 (9th Cir. 1970 ; United States v. Abell. 586 F. Supp. 1414 , 1422 (D. Me. 1984 ; Virgin Islands v. Berry, 385 F. Supp. 134, . [Vol. 84:1731 Finally, one should note that confessions are a valuable source of evidence. 99 "Evidence is the basis of justice: exclude evidence, you exclude justice." 100 Absent a violation of the confessant's rights, therefore, courts should not presume the inadmissibility of voluntary confessions. · Rather than the automatic suppression of all confessions obtained more than six hours after arrest, the courts should favor application of Mallory.
It is true, nevertheless, that one fact argues against this interpretation. This is the statement by Senator Scott, sponsor of the six-hour provision, that its purpose was to "provid[e] that the period during which confessions may be received . . . shall in no case exceed 6 hours." 101 It is possible that Senator Scott misspoke, or intended this statement to apply only to cases in which there has been a violation of rule 5(a). If this was not Senator Scott's intent, one has trouble squaring the avowed purpose of the amendment with its language and with the congressional intent to broaden the admissibility of confessions. No easy reconciliation is possible.
CONCLUSION
Section 3501 creates a safe harbor for confessions obtained within six hours after arrest. It does nothing more. It does not make voluntariness the sole criterion for admissibility; it does not redefine "unnecessary delay" in rule 5(a) to exclude any delay within the first six hours of arrest; and it does not render all post-sixth-hour confessions inadmissible unless the delay fits within the narrow literal bounds of the proviso in subsection 350l(c). Under section 3501, confessions obtained within six hours of arrest are admissible; the admissibility of confessions obtained thereafter should be determined by Mallory. Sloppy legislative drafting and sloppy analysis of legislative history have made section 3501 much more complicated than it needs to be. 101. 114 CONG. REC. 14,184 (1968) .
